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Human cooperation for reasons other than self-interest has long intrigued social
scientists leading to a substantial literature in economics. Its complement – sectari-
anism – has not received closer attention in economics despite its significant impact.
Based on a dynamic model, the paper shows that sectarianism can be understood as
the outcome of a repeated bargaining process in which sectarian affiliation evolves
into a pure coordination signal that attributes economic and political benefits. It
demonstrates that such sectarian social contracts co-evolve with the sects’ degree
of coerciveness and are self-reinforcing. Sectarian conflict may then not be a result
of diverging religious ideologies but is shown to be caused by external manipula-
tions of the signal (e.g. via identity politics), and internal political and economic
grievances within a sect that spill over to the inter-sectarian level while adopting a
sectarian appearance. Theoretical results are supported by empirical findings from
the Middle East.
Keywords: Sectarianism, Cooperation, Evolutionary Game Theory, Agent-Based
Modelling
1 Introduction
The evolution of cooperation has received much scientific attention during the past two decades
and has brought together economists, anthropologist, and sociologists.1 On the other hand, its
antithesis - sectarianism - has not been studied in the same detail, and the evolutionary basis
remains under-researched across the social sciences. It remains heavily debated by political sci-
entists, while economists have mostly ignored sectarianism. Yet in August 2020, an explosion
in Beirut demonstrated only to clearly the significant socio-economic impact it can have on a
society. Furthermore, the Lebanese Civil War, the Yugoslav Wars, the Rwandan Genocide, and
the Syrian Civil War are only but a few examples of sectarian-driven conflicts since the past
1The editors of Science ranked cooperation as one one of the top 25 questions facing scientists today (Pennisi,
2005).
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century. Sectarian societies forgo opportunities of mutually advantageous exchange and cooper-
ation between members of different religious affiliations while sectarian conflict is harmful both
at a group and an individual level.2
Contrary to common perception, but supported by the literature (e.g. Barr, 2011; Makdisi,
2000; Salloukh et al., 2015), the paper argues that sectarianism and sectarian conflict may not
be driven by religious ideologies, but can be seen as an evolutionary solution to a bargaining
problem which distributes benefits according to sectarian affiliations. Sectarian conflict is then
the result of a signalling mismatch or a contestation of the sectarian signal. To support this
theory, the paper explores the factors leading to sectarianism and sectarian conflict, using ana-
lytical tools from evolutionary game theory and agent-based modelling. Going beyond existing
literature, this paper demonstrates a first mathematical approach to the analysis of sectariani-
sation that systematically identifies and studies the determinants of sectarianism and sectarian
conflict. Although the theoretical approach is based on a simple model of exchange which does
not take account of the individual characteristics of sectarianisation in different regions, it is able
to replicate the predominant and general characteristics of sectarianism and sectarian conflict.
The model offers a clearer understanding of the underlying dynamics and demonstrates the co-
evolution of seemingly ideological fronts along sectarian lines, and socio-economic or political
benefits. It shows that religious affiliation may not be the cause of sectarianism but serves as its
crucial descriptive characteristic. The evolutionary model provides strong support for the liter-
ature arguing that sectarianism is rooted in and reinforced by endogenous social and economic
grievances and imposed inequalities linked to a group’s cultural identity (for a broad overview
of both the specific reasons and the general properties, see Hashemi and Postel, 2017 and for
an empirical example, see Mitra and Ray, 2014). It further demonstrates that sectarian contracts
are self-reinforcing and hence, the need for active policy measures.
2 Literature and Context
Sectarianism has been extensively studied by political scientists, and in recent years, especially
in the Middle Eastern context. Recent in depth analyses of the region are provided by Hashemi
and Postel (2017) and Wehrey (2017). A good overview of the historical context in the Mid-
dle East is provided in Barr (2011), while Salloukh et al. (2015), Salibi (1988), and Makdisi
(2000) offer detailed analyses of the specific context of Lebanon. These authors are part of a
modern interpretation of sectarianism that disagrees with other explanations (e.g. Nasr, 2006;
Lewis, 1997) which argue on the basis of a primordial or instrumentalist perspective. The pri-
mordial, instrumentalist, and constructivist perspectives are not homogeneously defined in the
literature and tend to conflate and intermix (for a critical study, see Tilley, 1997). Yet, in the
context of sectarianism, the former primordial perspective is frequently based on a historical
explanation postulating that religious conflicts are fuelled by instinctive impulses, innate social
characteristics and ancient or perceived social givens (on the latter, see especially Geertz, 1973).
Reinforced by tribal blood feuds for one and a half millennia, this has organically shaped and
reinforced a cultural predisposition to violence. Sectarianism and sectarian conflict are deeply
2See, for example, the fatwas forbidding Sunnis to eat meat slaughtered by Shi’as or the marriage between both
sects.
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rooted in the social relations of sectarian societies defined by inevitable and lasting perpetual
sectarian differences.
Instrumentalism (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Lake and Donald, 1998; Taylor and Yapp,
1979), on the other hand, postulates that sectarian and ethnic conflict are externally created
and reinforced by state and political actors who construct identities to advance their political
and economic interests by emphasising on in-group similarities and out-group differences. This
paper provides strong support for a mixed approach - the constructivist perspective - which
recognizes the significance of pre-determined (and potentially imagined) differences in ethnic
or religious identities, but also the changing character of these identities and perceives them as
not inevitably driving a social system into conflict. Active manipulation by leaders, elites, and
external actors play a critical role in the mobilisation process. Religious identities take on the
role of markers of evolving socio-economic cleavages and demands.
Since the study of sectarianism is a natural extension of the study of cooperation, existing
models of cooperation are therefore a fertile basis for developing analytical models of sectarian-
ism. Sociobiology studies the evolution of social behaviour within species via natural selection
(e.g. Wilson, 1975) and offers a wide plethora of models (Hamilton, 1975; Keller, 1999; Wade,
1978; Wilson, 1980). In social systems, fitness based replication is substituted by (biased) cul-
tural transmission (see Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1973; Dawkins, 1976; Popper, 1979 and
especially, Boyd and Richerson, 1988, 2005a). However, models of cooperation frequently as-
sume small populations defined by simple and recurrent interactions, where either detrimental
actions against a group lead to a punishment of the specific individual perpetrator or behaviour
that may not be beneficial for an individual is supposed to be beneficial for a group as a whole.
These conditions do not generally hold in sectarian societies.
While economists have not studied sectarianism, some economists have examined ethnic con-
flict which is functionally analogous to sectarianism. However, literature discussing the theoret-
ical underpinnings of intra-state ethnic conflict (e.g. Esteban and Ray, 2011) frequently assumes
a pre-existing segregation and hostility between groups while relying on some version of the
contest model. In these models, contest occurs only at the group level, often reduced to two
uniform groups, i.e. rebels and government (other examples are Haavelmo, 1954; Hirshleifer,
1988, 1989; Garfinkel, 1990; Grossman, 1991; Skaperdas, 1992 and for a broader overview, see
Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), thus disregarding the co-evolution
of conflict and ethnic divide. Other literature focuses on collective actions and free-riding (for
further elaboration, see Tullock, 2005; Weinstein, 2005) as well as the principal motivators (on
the grievance versus greed debate, see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Keen, 2012), and the role of
individual incentives and social sanctions (for the impact of these effects on intra-state conflict,
see Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Similarly, the multi-dimensionality of sectarianism re-
quires that a proper study does not focus on religious or ethnic fault lines alone, but includes
the socio-economic institutional framework. A number of scholars illustrate that ethnicity is
exploited for economic and political competition (Bates, 1983; Fearon, 2005; Chandra, 2004).
The feedback between political and economic benefits and sectarian conflict is therefore essen-
tial for understanding the evolutionary dynamics underlying sectarianism. This renders the paper
more akin to the literature focusing on the co-evolution of institutions and culture (e.g. Belloc
and Bowles, 2013; Bisin and Verdier, 2015; Bowles, 2004; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Boyd and
Richerson, 2005b; Levine and Modica, 2012).
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Identity is another essential constituent of sectarianism. While identity economics (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2010) fails to explain crucial characteristics of religious groups (for a discussion,
see Ille, 2017), it forms a theoretical basis for studying the connections between group identifi-
cation (e.g. perceived in-group similarity and out-group dissimilarity, see Basu, 2005) and the
internalization of ideals and norms (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Bernheim, 1994, see also so-
cial identity theory, Goffman, 1959). Identity influences preferences and decisions, determines
power relations and social interactions, and creates a sense of belonging (Horst et al., 2009). It
explains characteristics of sectarianism, such as status effects (Veblen, 2009) and public actions
(Granovetter, 1978), upholding norms and retaliating against norm violators (Fehr and Gächter,
2000), as well as ostracism of outsiders and favouritism of insiders (Sherif et al., 1961). Identity
formation simultaneously feeds on and causes sectarianism leading to a recursive relationship.
This literature includes two models that serve as a starting point for this research. The model
by Choi and Bowles (2007) illustrates the conditions necessary for the evolution of ostracism
and group conflict, as well as discriminatory (or parochial) altruism in the presence of uncon-
ditional altruism. The system’s dynamics are determined by a biological selection process that
operates simultaneously at an intra- and inter-group level. The model can be easily adapted to
the given context by adjusting the migration rate, the replication process, and the frequency of
interaction. While such an extension of Choi and Bowles (2007) can explain a number of prop-
erties of sectarian conflict (such as the co-evolution of parochial behaviour and conflict), the
model’s dynamics are fundamentally affected by group size. In larger group sizes, parochial and
altruistic traits do not persist in the long-run. The model can therefore not explain sectarianism
in larger societies. In contrast, the model in Axtell et al. (2001) is based on a Nash demand
game, similar to the one used here, and provides an intuition for the occurrence of in-egalitarian
and discriminatory institutions, while being unaffected by population and group size. However
in this model, institutional change occurs by chance and institutions are generally efficient since
individuals coordinate in most interactions. Instead of providing a strong rational of the under-
lying dynamics, individuals coordinate either on an egalitarian or in-egalitarian equilibrium out
of an ergodic process and a coincidental sequence of non-best replies.3 The model thus cannot
explain the coercive nature of sectarianism that leaves potential for free-riding, as well as the
occurrence of enduring sectarian conflict since agents only settle on pure strategy equilibria in
the long-run. In contrast, the model presented in this paper takes account of the co-evolution
of sectarianisation and the coercive measures taken by sectarian members. As a result, the evo-
lution of a sectarian social contract is not driven by random actions, but by social imitation.
The closed-form solution of the simplified model studies the dynamics defining a sect’s coer-
civeness and provides conditions under which a society converges to a particular equilibrium,
thereby eliminating social contracts that are implausible in the long-run. In addition, the simu-
lations extend the initial model and show how institutional conditions can support the evolution
of sectarianism and sectarian conflict.
In the absence of a uniform definition in the literature, I define sectarianism as a form of
social contract that attributes socio-economic privileges and political rights based on the ad-
herence to a specific religious sect. Sectarian conflict is then defined as a violent contestation
3With a small probability, an actor erroneously chooses a strategy other than the best response to her prior experi-
ence.
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of this social contract, i.e. a persistent state of coordination failure in which sect members do
not mutually agree on a social contract and aim to impose advantageous sharing norms based
on coercive measures. Following the constructivist perspective, neither sectarian identities nor
sectarian conflict are assumed to exist a priori, but are an emergent property determined by the
history of endogenously established interactions and practice between individuals. I focus on
the conditions necessary for the evolution of sectarianism and the mutual re-enforcement of its
characteristics. Since sectarian affiliation only serves as a signal for the distribution of rights and
privileges, I study under which condition a discriminatory marker defining an individual’s posi-
tion in a socio-economic contract emerges that is linked to sectarian affiliation. I further analyse
the factors supporting an endogenous evolution of the coercive nature of sectarianism, which
enforces abidance to a sectarian social contract, as well as the drivers of conflict in a sectarian
society.
The following section elaborates the baseline model that will provide a general comprehension
of the systems’ dynamics based on a closed-form solution. This model is extended in section
4 to provide a fuller understanding of the underlying dynamics of sectarianisation and sectarian
conflict by adding institutional drivers, such as a collective and individual history, identity pol-
itics, favouritism, and different forms of social learning to the model. Section 5 interprets the
theoretical results, compares them with empirical findings and concludes.
3 The basic model with two sects
Assume that all members of the population are randomly matched in pairs to play a simplified
Nash demand game with three possible strategies. The demand game is thereby representative
of the determination of a general social contract in which individuals demand a share or set of
political rights or socio-economic benefits. Each player l can choose a pure strategy sl ∈ S =
{L,M,H}, where L stands for demanding low equivalent to a share of (1−λ ) for λ ∈ (0.5,1),
M for medium equivalent to a share of 50%, and H for high equivalent to a share of λ . Obtaining
a larger share is in the interest of each individual, yet should the joint demands of both matched
players exceed 100%, no social contract is formed and both will receive nothing. The payoffs




L 1−λ ,1−λ 1−λ ,0.50 1− λ ,λ
M 0.50,1−λ 0.50, 0.50 0,0
H λ , 1− λ 0,0 0,0

 (1)
The three Nash equilibria are shown in bold. A socially efficient outcome occurs if the joint
net gains from exchange are equal to 1. All three Nash equilibria are socially efficient, but only
(M,M) is egalitarian.4
4Note that the equilibria are identical under the assumption that the inegalitarian outcomes are socially inefficient
(e.g. by defining the payoffs as λ for H and (1−λ − ε) for L and a small ε > 0 in outcomes (L,H) and (H,L)).
The reason for excluding this assumption is here to focus on social efficiency caused by coordination failures,
instead of confounding both sources of inefficiency. The following results are unaffected by this assumption and
also hold if a small dead-weight loss occurs at inegalitarian/sectarian social contracts.
5
Assume that two sufficiently large subpopulations, i.e. sects, each of size n exist and that
only members of different sectarian affiliation are matched. Members of a sect are identified
by an arbitrary marker. For a sect i = {1,2}, I define xi as the frequency of L-players, yi as
the frequency of H players and zi = 1− xi − yi as the frequency of M-players. Both players
can only make one offer per matching. Since each player does not know what her counterpart
will demand, she can only choose a strategy based on the likelihood of encountering a player
choosing a particular pure strategy. In the absence of segmentation, the likelihoods equal the
frequencies in the population.Since all frequencies add up to 1, any population distribution of
sect i can be defined by the tuple (xi,yi). Assuming that interactions take place regularly over
time and players update their strategy by comparing their own payoffs to the payoffs of others,
the changes to the population frequencies can be modelled by the following replicator equations
ẋi = xi(πxi −φ) (2a)
ẏi = yi(πyi −φ) (2b)
where πxi and πyi define the expected payoff for choosing strategy L and H, respectively, and
φ = xiπxi + yiπyi + ziπzi defines the average payoff in sect i. In other words, whenever a strategy
does better (worse) than the average, its frequency increases (decreases).
Furthermore, players are assumed to choose whether to coerce other players into accepting
their offer. Therefore, in addition to choosing between strategies low, medium, and high, they
can be of one of two types: either coercive (indicated by superscript c in the following) or
acquiescent (indicated by superscript a).5 While an acquiescent type does not take any further
actions if paired with another player and joint demands exceed 1, all coercive members join the
coercive player of the same sect and collectively attempt to impose H on the other player. Thus,
success of coercion depends on the abundance of coercive players in the respective sect. Let
the type frequency of coercive members in sect i = {1,2} interacting with a member of sect








All probabilities extend over the entire unit interval, but include the possibility of a member in
a sect with fewer other coercive members to decide the conflict in her favour. If the member
succeeds, she receives her highest possible payoff of λ and receives a payoff of zero otherwise.
Since the losing party receives a payoff of 0 instead of (1−λ ), any coercive action constitutes a
socially inefficiency outcome.7 Each time a coercive player loses, all her supporters pay a cost.
5In general, I will use type to refer to being coercive or acquiescent, whereas strategy refers to choosing to demand
low, medium, or high.
6While the literature on conflict frequently employs a different functional form for contest success probabilities
pi, i.e. pi = αi/(αi +α j) (see Skaperdas, 1996), the functional form used here is common in the evolutionary
literature (see e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Choi and Bowles, 2007) and the simulation results are independent
of the form used. The former probabilities, however, generate significantly more complicated eigenvalues and
render the analysis of the closed-form solution impracticable.
7One might argue that a player should only impose her original demand and not the maximum given by λ . How-
ever, to be consistent, the cost of coercion should also depend on the original demand. This will unnecessarily
complicate the model without adding much to its explanatory power.
6





The share of encounters at which joint demands exceed 1 and a member is coercive in sect i is
ζi = αi (ziy j + yiz j + yiy j) (5)
Further assume that each unsuccessful encounter results in a loss of σi > 0. The cost is shared





(1+α j −αi)((1− xi)y j + yiz j)σi
2
(6)
The expected payoffs for the six strategy-type combinations for sect i is given by
πaxi = 1−λ (7a)
πayi = λ x j (7b)
πazi = 0.50(x j + z j) (7c)
πcxi = 1−λ − γi (7d)
πcyi = λ
(









Consequently, being coercive and choosing strategy L is strictly dominated. Since expected
benefit of coercion has to outweigh cost, the surplus of a coercive type is
πczi −π
a
zi =(1−ηi)λy j − γi for an M player (8a)
πcyi −π
a
yi =(1−ηi)λ (1− x j)− γi for an H player (8b)
Both types benefit from an increase in the share λ obtained by successfully enforcing a demand
of high, and suffer from an increase in the additional cost of an unsuccessful coercion. In a state
of randomized strategy and type frequencies, πczi > π
a




yi if λ > 0.5σi.
The dynamic system is then defined by 3 equations for each sect i
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zi. The equilibria of this
dynamic system are given by any distribution at which no change in the population frequencies
occurs, i.e. at ẋ1 = ẋ2 = ẏ1 = ẏ2 = α̇1 = α̇2 = 0. However, the long-run evolving properties
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of this model are of greater interest. Individuals are prone to commit errors and to rarely but
recurrently choose a strategy that is not their best response. Evolutionary stable or asymptoti-
cally stable states are unaffected by this kind of idiosyncratic play, as long as the latter occurs
sufficiently infrequently. The stability of an equilibrium is then determined by the eigenvalues
of the Jacobian of the six-dimensional system at this fixed point.
However, solving for ẋ1 = ẋ2 = ẏ1 = ẏ2 = 0 defines six strategy equilibria, in which joint de-
mands do not exceed 1. Consequently, coercion is never enforced, and coercive and acquiescent
members obtain the same payoff. Since π̄ci = π̄
a
i , equation 9c is zero for any (α1,α2) across the
unit interval. Any such type equilibrium is neutrally stable at the strategy equilibria. To address
this problem, I will first study the stability of the strategy equilibria for any α1,α2 ∈ [0,1], and
thereafter, the stability of the type equilibria in the vicinity of the stable strategy equilibria.
The strategy equilibrium analysis shows that the three potentially evolutionary/asymptotically
stable states are identical to those three pure strategy Nash equilibria of the simpler Nash demand
game without types. However, the eigenvalues define the following additional conditions8
{
xi = 1,yi = 0,x j = 0,y j = 1
}




























In the equilibrium of 10a, members discriminate according to sectarian affiliation, while the
equilibrium of 10b is non-discriminatory. I will therefore refer to the former as a sectarian























Figure 1 provides an illustration for the shape of α̂ei and α̂
s
i given various parameter values
for λ . All equilibria are stable at α1 = α2 = 0. While the egalitarian contract remains stable at
α1 = α2 = 1, the sectarian contracts are only stable at this type distribution if λ < 2/3. Sectarian
contracts, on the other hand, are stable at α j = 1 and αi = 0, while at the egalitarian contract, it
must hold that α j < (4λ/(λ +4))
−1/2 − 1
2
< 1 for αi = 0. An increase of the unilateral gains λ
of a sectarian contract consolidates this type of social contract if the benefiting sect is strongly
coercive and the other sect acquiesces. However, it promotes the evolution of an egalitarian
contract if both sects are strongly coercive.
8Note that we can write the conditions as αi < (1−λ )/((1−ηi)λ ) and αi < (2(1−ηi)λ )
−1, respectively, which
shows that the thresholds are functions of the winning probability and the gains from H.
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(a) Threshold value α̂si of sectarian contract
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(b) Threshold value α̂ei of egalitarian contract
Figure 1. Threshold values α̂ei and α̂
s
i given various parameter values for λ .
Given equation 9c, the interior stationary values for αi for i, j = {1,2} and i 6= j are given by
the isolines at α̇i = 0 which are
α̃i =
(1+α j)σi − (1−α j)λ
λ +σi
(12)
Since for αi > α̃i (αi < α̃i) the share of coercive members in sect i will increase (decrease), the
isolines in 12 determine the equilibria’s basins of attraction.9 The isolines are independent of
the strategies, and hence, the direction (but not the speed) of the dynamics are unaffected by
the strategy distributions of both sects. The stability of the type equilibria can thus be studied
independently of the values of x1, x2, y1, and y2. The nulls of equation 9c and the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian return two unconditionally asymptotically stable equilibria, defined by
{α1 = 0,α2 = 1} and {α1 = 1,α2 = 0} (13)
two conditionally asymptotically stable equilibria
{α1 = 0,α2 = 0} only asymptotically stable if λ < σ1,σ2 (14a)
{α1 = 1,α2 = 1} only asymptotically stable if λ > σ1,σ2 (14b)














9An equilibrium’s basin of attraction defines the set of states which dynamically evolve to this equilibrium. In
the presence of infrequent idiosyncratic and erroneous individual choices, the basin of attraction therefore is
indicative of the likelihood with which this equilibrium occurs.
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implying that an increase in the cost of coercion for sect i moves α̃i towards the {ai = 1,a j = 0}
state, thereby decreasing its basin of attraction. An increase in the benefits of a sectarian contract,
given by λ has the inverse effect. Thus, the basin of attraction of the {a1 = 1,a2 = 1} state is
largest at σ1,σ2 ≈ 0 and λ ≈ 1, i.e. at very small costs of coercion and large unilateral gains at
the sectarian contract. In the inverse scenario at σ1,σ2 ≫ 0 and λ ≈ 0.5, the basin of attraction
of {a1 = 0,a2 = 0} is maximal. In the absence of coercive members, the interaction follows
the classical Nash demand game and the basin of attraction of the egalitarian contract increases
in λ . If the costs of coercion of both groups are not identical the likelihood of the sectarian
equilibrium increases with the difference in costs and relative to the potential gain λ .










(a) σ1 = 0.3,σ2 = 0.3,λ = 0.99









(b) σ1 = 0.3,σ2 = 0.3,λ = 0.51










(c) σ1 = 1,σ2 = 1,λ = 0.75










(d) σ1 = 3,σ2 = 0.3,λ = 0.75
Figure 2. Dynamics of α1 and α2 for different values of σ1, σ2 and λ .
10
Figure 2 illustrates different scenarios and demonstrates the impact of σ1, σ2, and λ on the
dynamics of α1 and α2. Conditions 10a, 10b, 13, 14a and 14b define the system’s long-run equi-
libria. For example, assuming that a sufficiently large population is initially entirely randomly
distributed implies that it is initially situated at the centre of the mixed-strategy/type simplex, i.e.
at x1 = x2 = y1 = y2 = 1/3 and α1 = α2 = 1/2. If λ > σ1,σ2, dynamics will push the population
towards α1 = α2 = 1 and z1 = z2 = 1. Low costs of coercion and a high prospective gain from a
sectarian contract will lead to a balance of power and hence, an egalitarian contract in which all
individuals are coercive. The coercive character of this state renders the equilibrium more stable
against individual idiosyncratic choices and thus decreases the likelihood of a sectarian contract
(due to the violation of condition 10a). I denote such an equilibrium a consociational contract.
On the other hand, if σ j > λ > σi, equation 12 shows that such an initially random distribution
will converge to a sectarian contract, defined by yi = x j = 1, αi = 1, and α j = 0. The conditions
do not directly define the long-run strategy composition of the population if λ < σ1,σ2. How-
ever, since α1 = α2 = 0 in the long-run, the interactions will revert back to the standard Nash
demand game. If the convergence of the types occurs sufficiently rapidly, the population will
evolve towards an egalitarian contract z1 = z2 = 1 since the centre of the unit simplex is within
the basin of attraction of the latter asymptotically stable state.
In general terms, this implies that a sectarian society is likely to evolve if only one sect has a
higher gain from such a contract than the cost of coercion.10 If both sects are initially defined
by similar characteristics, the pervasive social contract will be egalitarian or consociational de-
pending on how effortlessly norm adherence can be enforced by few coercive members. Once a
population settles into a contract, only exogenous changes to the ability and the cost of coercion
in conjunction with idiosyncratic actions can destabilize the equilibrium. Since the equilibria
are asymptotically/evolutionarily stable, any social contract is self-reinforcing in the absence of
such exogenous change.
4 Extensions
Although the simple model offers an explanation for some of the dynamics we observe in sec-
tarian societies, it ignores several important drivers of sectarianisation. It can therefore explain
sectarianism only on the basis of differences in the cost of coercion and does not demonstrate
reasons for sectarian conflict, since any population will always converge to a coordination equi-
librium. In its current form, the model takes account of the limited cognitive abilities of in-
dividuals, since individual choices are based on social learning. However, the model ignores
the historical component of sectarianisation and thus, the impact of past experience and a col-
lective memory on individual decision-making (Hashemi and Postel, 2017). In addition, the
model neglects the role of identity politics, differences in social learning, sectarian favouritism,
and intra-sectarian socio-economic grievances. This section will therefore extend the baseline
model and analyse the impact of factors other than the cost of coercion.
Akin to the literature using fictitious play with limited memory, assume that a member l of
sect i has a memory of size m and recollects the last history of interactions with sect members
of sect j. Thus, each time l makes a new experience with a member of i, she forgets the oldest
10Note that this also holds for the theoretical case in which costs equal gains for both sects.
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interaction and adds the latest interaction to her memory. Member l does not know with whom
she will be matched nor the strategy that will be played against her, but only that her counterpart
is of the opposite sect. She assumes the likelihood with which the latter chooses a strategy
is defined by the empirical frequency distribution of past play with the other sect. She then
chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff.11 For example, if an individual observes
that members of the other sect sufficiently frequently demand L, her best response in the current
period is to choose H.
If both strategies exceed a joint demand of one, and coercion is successfully attempted by
one sect, the winning member recollects that the losing sect played L and correspondingly, the
losing members recollects that the winning sect played H. If no contest occurs or no winner
is determined (i.e. the coercion has been unsuccessful), both parties retain the other’s original
offer. In this type of fictitious play, a player takes account of the type distribution in a limited
rational manner and not directly in the cognitively demanding way that a recollection of the
share of supporting coercive members for each period would require, but by remembering which
strategy was successful at the end of the interaction.
I further assume that members (denoted as learner) regularly update their types by comparing
their success over the past n periods to another member of the same sect (denoted as teachers)
and, for simplicity, I assume n = m.12 In addition, in some of these social learning encounters,
the learner does not only adopt the type of the teacher, but also the latter’s recollection of past
interactions. Depending on the relative frequency of this event with respect to the length of
memory m, individuals weigh higher either collective or individual memory. In the most extreme
case in which social imitation and an adoptions of a teacher’s past history occur in each period,
an individual bases her choice exclusively on the teacher’s memory. As long as members are
randomly matched, sect members will then base their choice on a common collective memory
after some time. If a player never embraces her teacher’s past experience, choice is exclusively
based on individual experience.
Separating the mechanism defining an individual’s choice of her strategy from that of her type
entails a form of multi-level selection. The strategy choice is based on an individual’s interaction
with the other sect (i.e. it is subject to cross-sectarian selection), while the type is defined based
an encounters with and in comparison to members of the same sect (i.e. it is subject to intra-
sectarian selection). At the same time, I also take account of the interplay between individual
experience and collective memory. To test the model’s robustness, I study the dynamics with
respect to four different common replicators. In each period, a share τ ∈ (0,0.5) of members of
sect i either
1. adopt the type of the best performing sect member in that period and with probability
ζ ∈ [0,1), the latter’s past memory (Variant 1).
2. are randomly paired with a member of the other sect, while one adopts the role of learner k,
the other of teacher l. If the teacher performs strictly better, the learner adopts the teacher’s
11Given the history of the m last interactions as defined by pure strategy-tuple sl j =(
s j(t),s j(t −1), . . . ,s j(t −m+1)
)
, let η tl (s j) : S j → N be the frequency that l observed a member of sect
j playing strategy s j in the past m interactions. Given the player’s payoff function πl : S → R, player l assumes
the likelihood of this strategy in period t is then µl(s j) = η
t
l (s j)/m and chooses sl ∈ argmaxsl∈Sl πl(sl ,µl).
12This assumption has no impact on simulation results as long as n is of similar scale to m.
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type with probability θ(πk,πl) ∈ (0,1) proportional to the payoff difference πk −π j and
in this case, the latter’s past memory with probability ζ (Variant 2).13
3. are randomly paired, and type and past memory are imitated as in Variant 2, but the teacher
is not randomly drawn from the entire sect, but from a predefined peer-group within the
sect i (Variant 3).
4. are randomly paired, and type and past memory are imitated as in Variant 2, but adop-
tion can even occur if the payoff difference is negative, such that θ(πk,πl) ∈ (0,0.5)
(θ(πk,πl) ∈ (0.5,1)) if learner k performs worse (better) than teacher l (Variant 4).
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These variants cover a broad spectrum of social learning replicators and are listed according to
their degree of selection pressure against the less efficient type. A less successful type will not
be imitated in variant 1 and has the highest likelihood of adoption if members follow variant 4.
To incorporates the superior ability of politically and economically more successful individuals




, with strictly positive constant κ
and π̄h being the population average after history h and πhk being the individual’s average payoff.
4.1 Simulation Results
All simulations show that the convergence time and likelihoods of the equilibria are independent
of groups size. Similarly, the size of the peer group relative to the entire sect’s population has
an insignificant impact on the likelihood of the final equilibrium. To understand the dynamics
of an unbiased system starting from a state in which no social contract has yet been determined
nor that is affected by external influence, each individual is initiated with a memory of past play
of length m drawn from a random distribution of all three strategies.
Table 1 shows the general results for each model. Since the likelihoods of each of the three
social contracts differ only marginally between variant 2 to 4, the table illustrates the joint results
for these replication variants. Table 2 provides details on the marginal impact of the variants and
parameters. Table 1 further demonstrates that likelihoods are critically dependent on whether λ
is below a critical value λ̄ . Sectarian conflict occurs whenever the likelihoods of the egalitarian
and the sectarian contracts sum to less than 100 percent.
In the balanced model, half of all members of each sect are initiated as coercive and sects are
identical in the first period of each simulation run, i.e. the population is initially at the centre of
the unit simplex in Figure 2. Table 1 shows that if social learning is defined by variant 2 to 4
and the potential gain λ is less than 0.9, the population converges to the egalitarian contract in
almost each simulation run. Extensive simulations show that this result is robust to changes in
the length of memories m and n, the share of members open to social learning τ , and the relative
importance of the collective memory ζ . For λ ≥ 0.9, a prolonged sectarian conflict occurs in ap-
proximately half of all simulation runs, while the population converges to an egalitarian contract
in the remaining half. If, in addition, ζ = 1 a sectarian conflict occurs in approximately three
fourth of all simulation runs. Thus, very high potential gains from a sectarian contract combined
13Note that this form of replication is closest to the one modelled by the replicator dynamics in section 3, see Weibull,
1997
14See Boyd and Richerson, 1992, for the underlying replicator dynamics.
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Table 1. Simulation Results: Likelihoods of Social Contracts in Percent
Variant 2 - 4 Variant 1
λ balanced unbalanced Identity Intern balanced unbalanced Identity Intern
< λ̄ egal. 100 40 0 99 70 50 0 95
sect. 0 54 76 0 20 50 81 2
≥ λ̄ egal. 50 9 0 0 23 9 0 5
sect. 0 57 2 1 30 76 32 0
Note: For balanced and unbalanced, λ̄ = 0.9, and for Identity and Intern, λ̄ = 0.8.
with a persuasive collective memory are the main drivers of a sectarian conflict if members
interact based on common social learning and sects are defined by roughly equal characteristics.
In the the unbalanced model, both sects are not initially equally coercive, but one sect is
initially composed of only 1 percent coercive members while the other sect consists of 99 percent
coercive members, i.e. the population is initially at the top left or bottom right corner of the
unit simplex in Figure 2. The chance of an egalitarian contract is now lower, while roughly
half of the simulation runs settle into a sectarian contract. The initially highly coercive sect
demands H and the acquiescent sect L. This is consistent with the results of section 3. In the
remaining simulation runs, the population remains in a state of sectarian conflict. For λ ≥ 0.9,
the chance of a sectarian conflict strongly increases while roughly half of all runs converge to
a sectarian contract. If a sectarian conflict occurs, all members are universally coercive. Figure
3 exemplifies the evolution of the strategy composition of both sects for three different runs.
The position of a sect is defined by the frequency distribution of the three strategies across the
members’ memory of past play. Since in the initial state, all members draw a random sample
from a strategy distribution of the three strategies, the sects are positioned at the centre of the
unit simplex at the beginning of each simulation run (i.e. x = y = z = 1/3). Figures 3a to 3c
show examples for the three possible scenario and the corresponding path each sect takes across
1,000 simulation periods.
















(a) Convergence to sectarian
contract















(b) Convergence to egalitarian
contract
















(c) No convergence to an equi-
librium
Figure 3. Example trajectories of both sects within the strategy unit simplex for 1,000 periods
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Model 1a in Table 2 provides a more detailed analysis. It illustrates the impact of all parame-
ters that significantly affect the likelihood of the egalitarian contract for replication variant 2 to
4.15 The dummy variable unbalanced separates between the above models. Dummy Clientelism
indicates whether a learner also receives the teacher’s accumulated payoffs from past interac-
tions. Clientelism should be interpreted as sectarian favouritism, i.e. obtaining social rights and
status by following one’s peers, or benefiting from legislation or economic ties that favour one
group over the other.
All parameters, except for the slightly positive effect of a longer memory, decrease the chance
of an egalitarian contract. An increase in memory length implies a longer reverberation of the
initial randomly generated memory and biases the dynamics towards an egalitarian contract. All
other parameters are positively correlated with selection pressure. Higher potential gains from a
sectarian contract, a stronger adherence to a collective memory, defined by ζ , a higher likelihood
of being matched in each period, defined by τ , and sectarian favouritism reduces the likelihood
of an egalitarian social contract. Similarly, replication variants 2 and 3 show an adverse effect
since both variants imply a higher selection pressure against an inferior type compared to variant
4, in which low performing members are imitated with positive probability.
Results change, if replication follows variant 1 and details are shown in Model 1b in Table 2.
A stronger influence of collective memory and more frequent matching benefit the egalitarian
contract. This contrasts with the other replication variants. If members are likely to imitate
singular dominant members, an increased exposure to these members and a stronger reliance
on collective memory increases the probability of an egalitarian social contract, contrary to the
other variants. As shown on the right of Table 1, both the initial type distribution and the gains
from demanding high affect dynamics. In both models, the egalitarian contract is significantly
less likely and the sectarian contract more probable if λ ≥ 0.9. A balanced initial distribution
is more prone than the unbalanced type distribution to settle in a sectarian conflict under variant
1 replication. In addition, while an increase in λ exerts limited influence on the likelihood of
a sectarian contract, it strongly shifts the odds against an egalitarian contract in favour of a
sectarian conflict under any replication variant.
4.2 Identity, Conflict, and Spill-overs
Sectarian identities are subject to changing institutional conditions and discursive practices
(Hashemi and Postel, 2017) and are thus constructed by a mixed socio-economic, political and
religious heritage. These endogenously evolving sectarian identities are implicitly included in
the model. The memory of past interactions, on which individuals base their choices, defines the
role and status that each individual attributes to members of a specific sect, i.e. the latter’s social
identity. At the same time, an individual’s offer and thus, the self-concept of her position in the
prevalent social contract, i.e. her personal identity, is defined in relation to this perception. Both
the sectarian contract and the egalitarian contract are each defined as a pure strategy equilibrium
in which mis-coordination is entirely absent. Consequently, under these social contracts, each
individual’s personal identity coincides with her social identity rendering interactions socially
15Note that if the sectarian contract is the dependent variable instead, the signs for each parameter are inverted while
the absolute values are approximately identical. This holds both for model 1a and 1b.
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efficient. Therefore, the model provides an explanation for the evolution of sectarian social con-
tracts that assign socio-economic benefits to a religious marker, but, at this stage, it still fails
to explain social conflict beyond being a rare random event if potential gains from a sectarian
contract are moderate.
Sectarian conflict occurs when discursive practices do not strictly follow an undirected evo-
lutionary process but are channelled by elites, and clientelist politics shape incentive structures
that prevent alternative non-sectarian social contracts. Elites accentuate differences to shape the
distribution of rights and economic privileges in their favour. This external exertion of influence
is simulated in model Identity (see Table 1) by assuming that individuals do not initially base
their choices on a history of randomly drawn strategies from the strategy set (L,M,H), as in the
previous simulations, but on a history that is defined by a random sample taken from the trun-
cated strategy set (L,H), i.e. exogenous politics stressed extreme positions and have completely
eliminated the memory of an egalitarian offer M. In this case, the population is not only unable
to coordinate on an egalitarian contract, but fails to converge to a sectarian contract with a high
likelihood for λ ≥ 0.8.16 Model 2a and 2b in Table 2 illustrate the impact of the independent
variables on the likelihood of a sectarian conflict for variants 2 to 4 and variant 1, respectively.
Increased selection pressure (both in regards to frequency of interactions and replication variant)
promotes sectarian conflict in model 2a. In model 2b, the share of matches per period decreases
the likelihood of a conflict, since members are matched with only the most successful member,
thus increasing coordination.
In addition, intra-sectarian inequalities based on exploitative socio-economic contracts are not
confined to sectarian boundaries, but can spill over and cause conflict at the larger cross-sectarian
level, while taking on a sectarian veneer. To test the model’s predictions, I split each sect into two
sub-groups in model Intern (see Table 1). I assume that individuals from different sub-groups
but the same sect are able to identify the other’s affiliation to a subgroup, whereas individuals
matched with a member of the other sect cannot discriminate beyond sectarian affiliation. At
the initial stage, a sequence of strategies drawn randomly from the entire strategy set define
each individual’s memory, equivalent to model 1. One sect is defined by one subgroup being
99 percent coercive, and the other subgroup being 99 percent acquiescent, while the other sect
has an equal share of coercive and acquiescent members in both subgroups. Thus while at the
aggregate, both groups seem identical (having the same total number of coercive and acquiescent
members), at the meso-level, one sect is defined by heterogeneous sub-groups and the other by
two homogeneous sub-groups.
Simulations show no significant difference between the four sub-groups and two sects. It
therefore is of no importance where the inequality originated, and the exploitative internal con-
tract can spill over to the other sect. Table 1 shows the impact of the potential gains λ from a
sectarian contract. At λ < 0.8, the population almost always converges to an egalitarian norm
but a cross-sectarian conflict occurs for λ ≥ 0.8. Model 3a and 3b in Table 2 shows which
variables promote cross-sectarian conflict for variants 2 to 4 and variant 1, respectively. All
variables, except memory length, positively contribute to a sectarian conflict. Model 3b offers
further details. Similar to model 1, the dependence of a collective memory and the frequency of
16Note that in the baseline model, strategy M is strictly dominated at λ < 0.75 if all acquiesce. Since λ is increased
in increments of 0.1, this explains the shift in regimes at λ = 0.8.
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social learning have an inverse effect compared to model 3a.
If the in-egalitarian intra-sectarian contract spills over to the other sect, conflict arises between
both sects with a likelihood of 30 percent under variants 2 to 4 and 70 percent under variant
1. Similarly, in a sectarian conflict, at least one sect remains internally in-egalitarian with a
likelihood of 37 percent under variants 2 to 4 and of 69 percent under variant 1, illustrating the
interaction between intra-sectarian inegalitarian contracts and cross-sectarian conflict. Model 4a
and 4b in Table 2 show the regression results for this state as the dependent variable for variants
2 to 4 and variant 1, respectively. Comparing the signs between model 3 and 4 shows that the
parameters have a similar impact in both models while collective memory and the frequency of
interaction differ in their impact based on the variant of social learning.
5 Interpretation and Conclusion
In contrast to the instrumentalist and primordial perspective, the model supports the perception
of sectarian identities as non-perpetual, but constructed by an endogenous process of past in-
teractions (for a detailed example, see Makdisi, 2000). Sectarianism therefore constitutes an
emergent property in which sectarian affiliation is not the cause of sectarianisation, but rather
serves as a marker or descriptive characteristic that assigns a role to each sect member in a
social contract. While the instrumentalist argument stresses that economic competition and
political opportunities are the principal incentives of political leaders to mobilize identities,
the model further shows that these components also directly constitute elements essential to
the endogenous evolution of sectarianism. The model demonstrates a co-evolution of political
and economic influence, and sectarian institutions; a fact which is observable in countries like
Bahrain, Syria, and Lebanon. Consequently, the paper argues that sectarianism is not necessar-
ily motivated by differences in religious ideologies and doctrines, but by political and economic
grievances. The self-stabilizing character of the sectarian equilibrium provides an intuition for
the self-reinforcing nature of sectarianism and stresses the need for active policy interventions.
As Hashemi and Postel (2017, pg. 21) write: ”Despite the constructed character, sectarianisation
has the ominous potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Putting the sectarian genie back
in the bottle is unlikely to be easy.” Further and contrary to the primordial perspective, a natural
social evolution of two groups sharing equal characteristics is unlikely to generate a sectarian
contract. The model identifies two principal cases in which sectarian contracts can develop: if
(1) an antecedent imbalance in the ability for coercive actions exists, or if (2) sect members
strongly identify with pre-eminent members.
In the first case, the model illustrates that ease and frequency of coercion, as well as sectar-
ian favouritism leading to political and economic imbalances foster the evolution of a sectarian
state. For example, the Kalashnikov culture and trade in contraband and narcotics have signif-
icantly contributed to sectarianism and sectarian violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Nasr,
2017). Consistent with the model’s predictions, while a tremendous number of militiae even-
tually consolidated a consociational contract in Lebanon, power imbalances in Syria and Iraq
supported the co-evolution of an increasingly coercive nature of individual interactions and a
sectarian social contract. The latter contract is more likely to evolve if individuals rely more
on a collectively shared memory than their own past experience, and are more inclined to adopt
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rituals and forms of engagements from supposedly more successful peers. This explains the in-
centives behind state actors and elites with an interest in an increased sectarianisation to invoke
the history and norms shared by sect members.
In the second case, however, adopting actions performed by the pre-eminent members, as
well as endorsing their past memories support the evolution of an egalitarian and non-sectarian
society, while the transfer of benefits from these members to their followers benefits a sectarian
contract. This might explain the ’Do as I say, not as I do’ mentality of elites, such as the Saudi
regime acting as a protector of the Shia minority (Al-Rasheed, 2017), or the collaboration of the
Al Khalifa family with Shia elites in Bahrain (Matthiesen, 2017), and the assignment of rights
and positions by sectarian elites, as is frequently found in countries like Lebanon.
The model further demonstrates that sectarian conflict is not a naturally evolving property
following a non-biased evolutionary process. The literature argues that a fragile state, class dy-
namics, and geopolitical rivalries form the principal impetus of sectarian conflict (Hashemi and
Postel, 2017). Correspondingly, the model demonstrates that socio-economic deprivations and
inequalities, as well as power asymmetries between sub-sect actors can spill-over to other groups
while taking on a sectarian appearance leading to a state-wide sectarian conflict. This explains
the transformation of non-sectarian uprisings, which initially represented a cross-section of so-
ciety, into conflicts along seemingly sectarian boundaries, like in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain in
2011. Similarly, the model also shows that the contestation of existing power relation and exter-
nally reinforced rivalries over socio-political dominance can lead to a disintegration of a social
contract and thus, to sustained sectarian conflict. Exogenous mobilisation based on economic,
social or political differences along sectarian identities can lead to persistent rivalries between
sects and a struggle over their position in a social contract (see for example the recent politics
employed by the Saudi regime in Al-Rasheed, 2017). This also shows why attempts to devitalize
critical movements and to deflect state criticism by strengthening other religio-political groups,
as has been done by Sadat and Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s, has led to an increase in sectarian vio-
lence. What then appears to be a narcissism of small differences is a conflict not motivated by
minor ideological disparities, but by a divergent perception of the role and rights assigned to the
sectarian marker.
The model shows that the prospect of significant socio-economic benefits for a sect under
a sectarian contract is an essential driver of sectarian conflict. The correlation between poten-
tial benefits and conflict is not simply linear, but the likelihood of a sectarian conflict changes
considerably if prospective gains cross a certain threshold. In addition, the model also demon-
strates the ambiguous role of collective memory (Ross, 2013; Páez and Liu, 2015; McGrattan
and Hopkins, 2016). While collective memory can help avoid sectarian conflict and support
peace building, it can severely destabilize any form of social contract in the presence of iden-
tity politics stressing sectarian differences and socio-economic inequalities within sects. This
has been empirically shown in Salloukh (2019), which illustrates how a selective deployment of
war memories is used as a tool against geopolitical and domestic threats while inciting sectarian
tensions. In illustrating the self-reinforcing character of sectarian conflict, the model demon-
strates the need for external intervention. It stresses the need to thwart politics which emphasize
sectarian differences and entitlements, and the important role of a balance of power among the
various religio-political groups, the reduction of socio-economic inequalities, thus the need for
contestation, and lastly, the individual gains from a sectarian contract in order to reinstate peace.
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Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. The
American Economic Review 90(4), 980–994.
Garfinkel, M. R. (1990). Arming as a strategic investment in a cooperative equilibrium. Ameri-
can Economic Review 80(1), 50–68.
Garfinkel, M. R. and S. Skaperdas (2007). Economicsofconflict: An overvie. In S. Todd and
K. Hartle (Eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 2. Elsevier, North-Holland.
20
Geertz, C. (1973). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. In C. Geertz
(Ed.), The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. Basic Books.
Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Doubleday.
Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. The American Journal of
Sociology 83(6), 1420–1443.
Grossman, H. I. (1991). A general equilibrium model of insurrections. The American Economic
Review 81(4), 912–921.
Haavelmo, T. (1954). A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution. North-Holland.
Hamilton, W. D. (1975). Innate social aptitudes of man: An approach from evolutionary genet-
ics. In R. Fox (Ed.), Biosocial Anthropology, Chapter 9, pp. 133–155.
Hashemi, N. and D. Postel (2017). Sectarianization - Mapping the New Politics of the Middle
East. Hurst & Company.
Hirshleifer, J. (1988). The analytics of continuing conflic. Synthese 76(2), 201–233.
Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflictand rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models
of relative success. Public Choice 63(2), 101–112.
Horst, U., A. Kirman, and M. Teschl (2009). Changing identity: The emergence of social groups.
Humphreys, M. and J. Weinstein (2008). Who fights? the determinants of participation in civil
war. American Journal of Political Science 52(2), 436–455.
Ille, S. (2017). Towards better economic models of social behaviour? identity economics. Stud-
ies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 17(1), 5–24.
Keen, D. (2012). Greed and grievance in civil war. International Affairs 88(4), 757–777.
Keller, L. (1999). Levels of Selection in Evolution. Princeton University Press.
Lake, D. A. and R. Donald (1998). The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict Fear, Diffusion,
and Escalation. Princeton University Press.
Levine, D. K. and S. Modica (2012). Conflict and the evolution of societies.
Lewis, B. (1997). The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2, 000 Years (Pocket Books:
Reprint edition ed.). Touchstone Book.
Makdisi, U. (2000). The Culture of Sectarianism. University of California Press.
Matthiesen, T. (2017). Sectarianization as securitization - identity politics and counter-revolution
in bahrain. In N. Hahsemi and D. Postel (Eds.), Sectarianization - Mapping the New Politics
of the Middle East, Chapter 8, pp. 143–158. Hurst & Company.
21
McGrattan, C. and S. Hopkins (2016). Memory in post-conflict societies: From contention to
integration? Ethnopolitics 16, 488 – 499.
Mitra, A. and D. Ray (2014). Implications of an economic theory of conflict: Hindu-muslim
violence in india. Journal of Political Economy 122(4), 719 – 765.
Nasr, V. (2006). The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. W. W.
Norton.
Nasr, V. (2017). International politics, domestic imperatives and identity mobilization - sectari-
anism in pakistan 1979-1998. In N. Hahsemi and D. Postel (Eds.), Sectarianization - Mapping
the New Politics of the Middle East, Chapter 8, pp. 143–158. Hurst & Company.
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Table 2. Simulation Results: Probit Regression showing Marginal Effects
Model (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Dependent Egalitarian Egalitarian Sectarian Sectarian Cross-sect. Cross-sect. Intern. Inegal. Intern. Inegal.
Variable Contract Contract Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict Cross-sect. Confl. Cross-sect. Confl.
Unbalanced -.7705 -.2831
(.00254) (.00592)
Play High -.0369 -0.271 .0821 .0323 .0468 .0434 .0064 .0284
Gain λ (.00024) (.0034) (.00068) (.00042) (.00046) (.00058) (.00011) (.00041)
Collective -.4042 .3546 .8818 .2065 .3687 -.2372 .1233 -.2884
Memory ζ (.00585) (.00924) (.01254) (.01211) (.00716) (.01397) (.00262) (.01094)
Share of -.2583 .2362 .6968 -.6095 .2973 -.4449 .1431 -.2297
Matches τ (.00560) (.00874) (.01158) (.01251) (.00685) (.01400) (.00278) (.01101)
Memory .0096 .0111 .0110 -.0026 -.0035 -.0108 -.0029 -.0102
Length m (.00013) (.00020) (.00022) (.00026) (.00013) (.00031) (.00005) (.00024)
Clientelism -.1035 -.0920 .1308 .0886 .1238 .2679 .0170 .1310
(.00387) (.00599) (.00611) (.00835) (.00430) (.00901) (.00161) (.00726)
Replication:
Variant 2 -.1467 .2859 .0200 -.0277
(.00500) (.00618) (.00514) (.00167)
Variant 3 -.1436 .2595 .0210 -.0297
(.00497) (.00637) (.00519) (.00166)
N 115,200 38,400 57,600 19,200 57,600 19,200 57,600 19,200
Pseudo R2 0.5307 0.3176 0.7572 0.3397 0.6776 0.4497 0.3293 0.3732
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Unbalanced, Clientelism and Type of Replication indicate discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to
1, all results statistically significant at p < 0.01. Reference group for the type of replication dummies is defined by variant 4. Clientelism is a dummy
variable indicating that past payoff is acquired from a teacher during social learning. Logistic regression generates very similar marginal effects.
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